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The purpose of the Littoral Combat Ship is to provide the Navy with an 
affordable, small, multi-mission ship capable of independent, interdependent and 
integrated operations inside the littorals.  The Littoral Combat Ship will be designed to 
replace high-value Naval assets when conducting high-end missions such as littoral Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine Warfare (MIW) and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) as 
well as perform low-end missions such as Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Non-
combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO).  In 
order to accomplish these missions and successfully counter the enemy’s littoral denial 
strategy, the Navy has stated the Littoral Combat Ship must incorporate endurance, 
speed, payload capacity, sea-keeping, shallow-draft and mission reconfigurability into a 
small ship design.  However, constraints in current ship design technology make this 
desired combination of design characteristics in small ships difficult to realize at any cost.  
This thesis (1) analyzes the relationship between speed, endurance, and payload to 
determine the expected displacement of the Littoral Combat Ship, (2) determines the 
impact of speed, displacement and significant wave height on Littoral Combat Ship fuel 
consumption and endurance, and (3) analyzes the implication of findings on Littoral 
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According to the United States 2002 Defense Planning Guidance, the Navy must 
develop the capability to maintain an Aircraft Carrier Operating Area clear of submarine-
delivered and floating mines, improve the capability to destroy or evade large numbers of 
submarines operating in the littorals and develop the capability to destroy large numbers 
of small anti-ship cruise missile-armed combatants or armed merchant vessels in the 
littoral areas, without relying on carrier based air.  Currently, sensors and weapons in the 
littoral environment have limited ranges due to environmental conditions and the clutter 
of maritime traffic.  In addition, the proliferation of high-tech weapons and sensors 
potentially provides the enemy with the tools necessary to exploit the vulnerabilities of 
our current Naval force when operating inside the littorals.  As a result, the Navy’s 
current ability to counter enemy submarines, small craft and mines in the littoral 
environment is limited.  It is for these reasons the Navy has stated the need for the 
Littoral Combat Ship. 
    The purpose of the Littoral Combat Ship is to provide the Navy with an 
affordable, small, multi-mission ship capable of independent, interdependent and 
integrated operations inside the littorals.  In order to accomplish these missions and 
successfully counter the enemy’s littoral denial strategy, the Navy has stated the Littoral 
Combat Ship must incorporate endurance, speed, payload capacity, sea keeping, shallow-
draft, and mission reconfigurability into a small ship design.  However, constraints in 
current ship design technology make this desired combination of design characteristics in 
small ships difficult and potentially costly, and may compromise supportability and 
sustainability.  This thesis (1) analyzes the relationship between speed, endurance, and 
payload to determine the expected displacement of the Littoral Combat Ship, (2) 
determines the impact of speed, displacement and significant wave height on Littoral 
Combat Ship fuel consumption and endurance, and (3) analyzes the implication of these 
findings on Littoral Combat Ship logistics.  While various hull forms are being 
considered for the Littoral Combat Ship (including, but not limited to the Surface Effect 
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Ship, Trimaran, SWATH technology and monohull), the JOINT VENTURE high-speed, 
wave-piercing catamaran is currently being tested by the military as a surrogate Littoral 
Combat Ship.  As a result, the Littoral Combat Ship modeled in this thesis is based on the 
JOINT VENTURE seaframe. 
The thesis demonstrates that speed, displacement, and significant wave height all 
result in considerable increases in fuel consumption, and as a result, severely limit 
Littoral Combat Ship endurance.  When operating in a significant wave height of six feet, 
regardless of the amount of fuel carried, the maximum endurance achieved for a Littoral 
Combat Ship outfitted with all modular mission packages is less than seven days.  
Especially noteworthy is that when restricted to a fuel reserve of 50% and a fuel carrying 
capacity of Day tanks, the maximum achieved endurance is only 4.8 hours when 
operating at a maximum speed of 48 knots.  Refueling, and potentially rearming, will 
require the Littoral Combat Ship to leave littoral waters and transit to Combat Logistics 
Force ships operating outside the littorals for replenishment.  Given the low endurance of 
the Littoral Combat Ship, its time on station is seriously compromised.  This not only 
limits the Littoral Combat Ship’s ability to conduct independent operations, but restricts 
interdependent operations as part of a littoral operations force and integrated operations 
with Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups as well. 
Significant wave height not only has a considerable negative impact on fuel 
consumption and endurance, but also has the potential for devastating impact on Littoral 
Combat Ship operations and crew effectiveness.  The anticipated inability of the Littoral 
Combat Ship to effectively operate in ocean conditions beyond sea state 6 coupled with 
the real possibility of experiencing sea states 7 and beyond demonstrates the potential for 
the Littoral Combat Ship to be forced to either delay or abandon assigned missions.  With 
regard to crew effectiveness, of the twenty-two personnel that were given a questionnaire 
regarding seasickness during joint Navy and Marine Corps testing of the JOINT 
VENTURE, 70% of those surveyed experienced dizziness, 65% experienced nausea and 
30% actually became seasick when operating in sea state 4 and below. 
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The Littoral Combat Ship can achieve high speeds; however, this can only be 
accomplished at the expense of range and payload capacity.  The requirement for the 
Littoral Combat Ship to go fast (forty-eight knots) requires a seaframe with heavy 
propulsion systems.  The weight of the seaframe, required shipboard systems (weapons, 
sensors, command and control, and self-defense) and modular mission packages accounts 
for 84% of the full displacement, and as a result, substantially limits total fuel carrying 
capacity.  Since initial mission profiles required the high-speed capability at most five 
percent of the time, the end result is a Littoral Combat Ship that has very little endurance 
and a high-speed capability it will rarely use.  The pursuit for high speed itself 
demonstrates an inherent bias toward the attribute of speed and the neglect of range and 
payload requirements.  Regardless of which hull form is selected for the Littoral Combat 
Ship, this thesis demonstrates the price that must be paid for speed as the tradeoffs 






























A. BACKGROUND  
In the late 19th century, the world was introduced to the torpedo boat.  These 
small, swift craft were able to race in close to larger ships, fire their torpedoes and 
quickly get away without suffering any damage.  In 1894, they demonstrated their 
abilities with overwhelming effectiveness in the Chilean Civil War and Sino-Japanese 
War.  By the mid-1890s, the United States recognized the need for a Naval asset to 
counter the torpedo boat and in 1902, the first U.S. destroyer, USS Bainbridge (DD 1), 
was commissioned. 
During the past century, advances in technology have lead to the creation of a 
new breed of fast, shallow-draft ships that operate in regions in which our Navy is not 
designed to operate.  Missile Frigates, Corvettes, Fast Patrol Crafts and Fast Attack 
Missile Boats, all of which are capable of speeds ranging from 30-50+ knots, have 
become standard equipment in many of the world’s Navies.  Even though the United 
States destroyer has evolved into a very capable and survivable Naval asset, its speed is 
only 30 knots and its draft of approximately 30 feet limit its ability to operate in shallow 
waters.  As a result, the United States is once again faced with developing a ship capable 
of countering threats with speed, maneuverability and lethality in waters far from our 
nation’s homeland.  “Today, the United States is master of the seas.  Unless we adapt our 
Navy for future war fighting in contested, close-in waters, however, we risk our ability to 
influence events.” (Cebrowski and Hughes, 1999).  The response to this is Sea Power 21:  
the new vision to transform the Navy in order to meet the challenges that lie ahead. 
(Bucchi and Mullen, 2002) 
 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The first fundamental concept and core element of Sea Power 21 is Sea Shield.  
One of the major components of Sea Shield is the concept of forward littoral dominance.  
According to the United States 2002 Defense Planning Guidance, the Navy must develop 
the capability to maintain an Aircraft Carrier Operating Area clear of submarine-
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delivered and floating mines, improve the capability to destroy or evade large numbers of 
submarines operating in the littorals and develop the capability to destroy large numbers 
of small anti-ship cruise missile-armed combatants or armed merchant vessels in the 
littoral areas, without relying on carrier based air. (Navy Warfare Development 
Command, 2003)    
Currently, sensors and weapons in the littoral environment have limited ranges 
due to environmental conditions and the clutter of maritime traffic. (Bucchi and Mullen, 
2002)  In addition, the proliferation of high-tech weapons and sensors potentially 
provides the enemy with the tools necessary to exploit the vulnerabilities of our current 
Naval force when operating inside the littorals.  As a result, the Navy’s current ability to 
counter enemy submarines, small craft and mines in the littoral environment is limited.  It 
is for these reasons the Navy has stated the need for the Littoral Combat Ship. 
The challenge of access and the requirements to perform missions across 
the operational spectrum – including logistics, medical support, 
humanitarian assistance in inhospitable areas, non-combatant evacuation 
operations, force protection, and maritime interception / SLOC patrols – 
suggest that new capabilities may be needed to rebalance the fleet.  The 
Navy could task the current force structure with these new littoral 
missions – but there are significant risks and costs associated with using 
expensive, high-end, power projection platforms against the enemy’s 
fairly inexpensive air, surface, and undersea platforms with their 
associated combat and information technologies.  Current fleet assets are 
sized for, and tasked with high-end missions and the associated training 
requirements to prepare for them.  Declining force numbers further impair 
the ability of our capital ships to perform additional access missions.  
Further, it is unlikely that we would, in the foreseeable future, be able to 
afford the numbers of multi-mission, high end ships it would take to fill 
the gaps in needed littoral capabilities. (Navy Warfare Development 
Command, 2003) 
As a result, the Navy has turned toward the development of the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS).  The purpose of the Littoral Combat Ship program is to provide the Navy 
with an affordable, small, multi-mission ship capable of independent, interdependent and 
integrated operations inside the littorals.  In order to accomplish these missions and 
successfully counter the enemy’s littoral denial strategy, the Navy has stated the Littoral 
Combat Ship must incorporate endurance, speed, payload capacity, sea-keeping, shallow-
draft, and mission reconfigurability into a small ship design (Navy Warfare Development 
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Command, 2003).  However, constraints in current ship design technology make this 
desired combination of design characteristics in small ships difficult and potentially 
costly, and may compromise supportability and sustainability. 
The Littoral Combat Ship must be able to operate long distances from home while 
remaining combat effective.  Some of the Littoral Combat Ship logistics requirements, 
such as fuel, food, stores, provisions and basic supplies, are common to most of the 
Navy’s high-value, blue-water ships.  However, since the Littoral Combat Ship is a 
modular design, it will also require a suite of modular weapon systems and associated 
support equipment capable of being configured to successfully achieve its operational 
tasking.  Currently, there exist a limited number of Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships 
that can be utilized for replenishing Navy ships at sea.  Since there is no indication a 
logistics support ship will be built specifically for the Littoral Combat Ship, the addition 
of the Littoral Combat Ship fleet is going to place an added strain on the already 
burdened CLF fleet.  Even though the CLF ships are capable of replenishing basic 
logistics requirements, they do not possess the capability to support modular 
reconfiguration.  In addition, to ensure the protection of the CLF ships, they often operate 
with high-value, blue-water units located outside the littoral environment.  These 
considerations raise the question of whether or not current replenishment capabilities are 
sufficient to effectively support sustained Littoral Combat Ship operations inside the 
littorals. 
Through the use of a model developed in Microsoft Office Excel, this thesis (1) 
analyzes the relationship between speed, endurance, and payload to determine the 
expected displacement of the Littoral Combat Ship, (2) determines the impact of speed, 
displacement and significant wave height on Littoral Combat Ship fuel consumption and 
endurance, and (3) analyzes the implication of these findings on Littoral Combat Ship 
logistics. 
 
C. SMALL SHIP DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Ideally, a small warship would be inexpensive and fast, carry a large payload and 
have high endurance and good sea keeping.  Unfortunately, the current state of 
technology prevents this combination.  As the offensive and defensive capabilities of a 
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ship increase, so must the size and cost of the ship, therefore, tradeoffs must be 
considered between speed, endurance, and payload during the design process.  
 
1. Definitions  
Size is physical magnitude, extent or bulk.  It is measured as the full displacement 
of the ship. 
Speed is the rate of motion.  It is achieved through the use of large, powerful 
engines.   
Endurance is the ability to sustain a ships mission.  It is measured by a ship’s 
range, sea keeping, fuel storage and consumption rate, and ordnance storage and delivery 
rate. 
Range is the maximum distance a ship can travel at “best speed” without 
refueling.  It is a combination of fuel capacity, fuel consumption rate and ships speed. 
Sea keeping is the effect of sea states on crew effectiveness. 
Survivability is the ability of a ship to avoid and/or withstand an enemy attack.  It 
is a combination of speed, maneuverability, stealth and/or strength of design materials. 
Payload is the number of weapons systems and their sensors capable of delivering 
ordnance on target.  It is related to speed and endurance by space and weight.   
(Kelley, 2002 and Merriam-Webster, 2003) 
The United States currently possesses the technology to outfit the Littoral Combat 
Ship with engines capable of producing ship speeds in excess of 60 knots.  However, 
these engines are large and increase the overall weight and displacement of the ship, 
thereby increasing fuel consumption and decreasing endurance.  Fuel capacity in itself is 
an opportunity cost; the more space and weight that are dedicated to it, the less that can 
be allocated to payload.  Typically, a modern warship’s mission payload makes up ten to 
fifteen percent of its full displacement; to increase it much beyond this, speed, range or 
survivability would have to be sacrificed.  (Kelley, 2002)  Currently, shipboard systems 
critical to survivability and combat effectiveness, such as the Aegis Combat System, 
ballistic defense missiles and large guns, cannot fit aboard small ships.  “A ship of less 
5 
than about 4,500 tons displacement would not be able to carry most of the major systems 
used for critical Navy missions, severely limiting its usefulness.”  (Kelley, 2002)  In 
order for the Littoral Combat Ship to achieve success as a small, multi-mission ship, 
these constraints in small ship design must be overcome. 
Figure 1 depicts the tradeoffs between ships speed, range, and payload with 
respect to the projected impact of future technology on ship performance. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Predicted Impact of Technology on Ship Performance 
 
It represents the maximum mission performance associated with the technology 
projections made by the Naval Surface Warfare Center’s Carderock Division High-Speed 
Sealift Innovation Cell project team.  Their work was conducted from May 2000 through 
August 2001, and the purpose of the project was to define the technology investments 
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required to enable development of the high-speed commercial and military ships needed 
to provide realistic future mission capabilities.  It shows that significant capabilities are 
scientifically possible using such technology projections in the near-term and the far-
term, where the near-term relates to technology that will be available in 5 years and the 
far-term, 10 years.  Full realization of capabilities shown in Figure 1 requires engineering 
development, particularly in packaging propulsion technology, advanced seaframes, and 
advanced materials and structures. (Naval Surface Warfare Center, 2002) 
 
 
D. STUDY PLAN 
Since the 1960s, the Navy has built three small, high-speed ship classes:  patrol 
gunboats during the 1960s, missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and patrol coastal ships 
during the 1990s.  Chapter II of this thesis considers these three small ship design 
programs and discusses the reasons for their limited operational usefulness. 
In Chapter III, the Littoral Combat Ship concept of operations is discussed and a 
model is designed to estimate the Littoral Combat Ship displacement.  According to a 
senior Navy official, the Littoral Combat Ship will be a non-traditional seaframe capable 
of high speeds (Koch, 2002).  Currently, the JOINT VENTURE (HSV-X1) high-speed, 
wave-piercing catamaran is being leased by the Army, in cooperation with the Navy, 
Marine Corps and Coast Guard, from Australia’s Incat International for testing high-
speed catamaran capabilities, potential operational impact and technologies.  The Joint 
Venture successfully took part in the Millennium Challenge ’02 experiment and 
performed well in support of Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom. 
(Baumgardner, 2002)  As a result, the Joint Venture high-speed, wave-piercing catamaran 
is utilized in this thesis as the Littoral Combat Ship seaframe to demonstrate the logistical 
implications of the speed, endurance, and payload tradeoffs with respect to the modular 
design of the Littoral Combat Ship.  The weight and space requirement of each onboard 
and modular system is determined and added to that of the JOINT VENTURE seaframe.  
Factors considered for full displacement calculations include the base seaframe; installed 
weapons systems, command and control systems and sensors; personnel and supply load 
levels; fuel storage capacity; ordnance load levels and modular systems (embarked 
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manned and unmanned air and sea vehicles).  The number and types of systems installed 
and amount of load-out ordnance varies based on the mission for which the modular ship 
is configured.  Hull design, fuel carrying capacity and supply load levels are derived from 
the JOINT VENTURE design.  Factors considered for endurance calculations include 
displacement, fuel storage levels, fuel consumption rates, speed and sea state. 
In Chapter IV, the impact of speed, displacement and significant wave height on 
Littoral Combat Ship fuel consumption and endurance is analyzed and the implication of 
these relationships with regard to Littoral Combat Ship logistics is discussed.  An 
analysis of Littoral Combat Ship off-station time due to required replenishment is 
conducted by determining the required frequency of replenishments and estimating how 
far the Littoral Combat Ship will have to transit to the replenishment ship.  Littoral 
Combat Ship replenishment requirements are compared with the current size and 
replenishment capabilities of the Combat Logistics Force in order to determine the 
overall impact of the added Littoral Combat Ship requirements. 
In Chapter V, a conclusion of the Littoral Combat Ship analysis is provided along 
with associated recommendations.  While this thesis based the design of the Littoral 
Combat Ship around the JOINT VENTURE hull form, the methodology followed applies 
to any high-speed ship as the tradeoff between speed, endurance, and payload must be 
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II. USN HISTORY OF HIGH SPEED SHIPS 
Throughout history, the United States Navy has invested a considerable amount of 
time and money in the development of high-speed ships.  Since World War Two, three 
high-speed ship classes have been commissioned and tested in hopes of achieving great 
military usefulness: the ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats during the 1960s, the 
PEGASUS class missile hydrofoils during the 1980s and the CYCLONE class patrol 
coastal ships during the 1990s.  However, each class failed to capitalize on the speed they 
were designed for and, as a result, failed to achieve the missions for which they were 
intended.  This chapter will provide an overview of these three small ship design 
programs and discuss the reasons for their limited operational usefulness.  Most of the 
historical information for the ASHEVILLE and PEGASUS class contained in this chapter 
was obtained from Norman Friedman’s book U.S. Small Combatants, Including Pt-Boats, 
Subchasers, and the Brown-Water Navy: An Illustrated Design History (1987). 
 
A. ASHEVILLE CLASS PATROL GUNBOATS (PG) 
In May 1961, the Ship Characteristics Board (SCB) asked for cost and feasibility 
studies for a small combatant designed primarily for surveillance, blockade, operations 
against other small crafts in coastal waters, and limited support of troops ashore.  
Tentative ship design characteristics included a length of 95 to 125 feet, a maximum draft 
of 8 feet (to allow for coastal operations), a speed of 30 knots, and an endurance of 1,500 
nautical miles at 17 knots.  A representative from the Long-Range Objectives (LRO) 
Group, an organization that determines naval requirements based on U.S. national 
strategy, determined that “in the future, there would be a place for small, relatively 
inexpensive, lightly manned coastal patrol craft aimed primarily at possible requirements 
in support of limited wars.” (Friedman, 1987)  The LRO went on to describe the patrol 
gunboat as being suitable for destroyer-type missions in waters where destroyers could 
not go or could not be risked. 
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In March 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara specifically called for a navy 
program of patrol gunboats to deal with Cuban-based covert aggression in South 
America.  Shortly thereafter, fleet commanders were asked for their own patrol gunboat 
force goals.  The Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) asked for a total 
of eight, which were to be used for contingency readiness and cold war operations in the 
Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, while the Commander-in-Chief Pacific 
Fleet (CINCPACFLT) asked for a total of twenty-seven, which were to be used in waters 
off of South Vietnam, Cambodia, China, and South Korea.  Initially, a total of eight 
ASHEVILLE class patrol gunboats were approved for construction (one per year in fiscal 
years 1963-1970), however, that figure was later increased for a planned total of twenty-
four at a cost of $1 million dollars each. 
Design work on a small (length of 95 feet) ship, which began in June 1961, was 
already running into problems.  The Bureau of Ships (BuShips) determined that, keeping 
within the previous stated ship design limits, they could achieve the desired speed but not 
the desired range due to the fact that the weight of the powerful diesel engines prevented 
the ship from carrying the necessary amount of fuel.  Additional problems began to 
surface.  Unimpressed with the performance of the 40 mm gun, they turned to the larger, 
and heavier, 3-inch/.50-caliber gun.  With the addition of the new gun, BuShips was now 
not only unable to obtain the desired range, but also could not achieve the desired speed.  
As a result, BuShips considered gas turbines as the only method of propulsion that could 
potentially yield the desired speed, endurance, and payload combinations.  In order to 
accommodate the gas turbine, it was determined the 3-inch/.50-caliber gun had to be 
moved aft and the length of the ship had to be increased. 
As the design process continued, BuShips engineers increasingly struggled with 
the tradeoffs between speed, payload and range.  They quickly realized that in order to 
achieve the combination they were looking for, they would have to increase the size of 
the ship.  Table 1 contains the first five patrol gunboat design proposals submitted by 
BuShips. (Friedman, 1987)  It includes the ship characteristics for each proposal along 




 Proposal 1 Proposal 2 Proposal 3 Proposal 4 Proposal 5 
Length (ft) 95.0 95.0 115.0 161.0 161.0 
Beam (ft) 19.8 22.0 24.2 25.0 24.0 
Draft (ft) 6.3 6.5 8.1 7.0 7.0 
Full Load (tons) 1 107.3 124.1 209.9 225.0 225.0 
Max Speed (kts)2 30 28 27 30 30 
Endurance     
(nm / kts) 
1,150 / 12 600 / 12 1,300 / 17 1,700 / 16 1,700 / 16 
Estimated Cost 
FY 1961 
$1.00 M $1.20 M $1.50 M $1.70 M $1.90 M 
Table 1.   Patrol Gunboat Designs, October 1961 
 
Notes: 1.  Includes the following armament:   
Forward Single .50-caliber gun  
  Aft:  Twin .50 caliber guns 
  Amidships: Two single .50 caliber guns (port and starboard) 
    3-inch/.50-caliber gun 
    Two 81 mm mortars at centerline 
 2.  Maximum speed at 50% fuel level. 
 
As BuShips proposals continued into 1962 none contained the answer senior 
officials were looking for.  In July, under a great deal of pressure, BuShips finally 
proposed it’s preliminary design, which measured 166.2 feet; however, that proposal was 
discarded the following month.  As BuShips continued the design process, costs 
continued to increase.  BuShips was able to design a ship that achieved a range of 1,900 
nautical miles at 16 knots; however, the cost to produce this ship rose to $2.7 million 
($3.9 million for the lead ship).  The total for the first two ships, $6.6 million, exceeded 
the $4.1 million that was authorized in the fiscal year 1963 budget, and as a result, 
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officials realized the allocated budget would only be sufficient to purchase the lead ship 
vice the first two ships of the ASHEVILLE class. 
After two years of efforts, speed was still driving the ship design process.  The 
desired speed eventually increased to 40 knots; however, this idea was abandoned after it 
became clear the ship would not be able to carry the necessary payload at that speed.  As 
a result, the speed requirement was finally dropped to 37 knots.  In 1963, the lead 
ASHEVILLE class ship was finally approved.  Table 2 contains the ASHEVILLE class 
ship specifications (Pike, 2002) and Table 3 contains ASHEVILLE class payload 
(Donaldson, 2003). 
 




Mission Profile Armament 
Anti-Surface Warfare - One 40 millimeter Gun 
- One 3-inch/.50-caliber Rapid 
Fire Gun 
- Two twin .50 caliber Machine 
Guns 
- M60 Machine Guns 
- M79 Grenade Launchers 
- Two Missile Launchers1 
Anti-Air Warfare None 
Anti-Submarine Warfare None 
Table 3.   ASHEVILLE Class Payload 
 
Note:  1.  Replaced 40 millimeter Gun aboard USS ANTELOPE (PG 86) and  
    USS READY (PG 87) only. 
 
Upon their entrance into the fleet, the ASHEVILLE class ships quickly received a 









Maximum Speed   
(knots) 
Range     
(nm / kts) 
Crew 
165 24 10.5 240 37 2,300 / 13 28 
13 
way in waves up to eight feet and pounding fore-to-aft motion of the ship's bow in up and 
down angles of 15 to 25 degrees.  Resting, sleeping and eating were extremely difficult 
under these conditions and fatigue overwhelmed even the most seasoned sailors.  Crews 
riding out 10-foot waves for more than 72 hours would become badly fatigued, so 
maximum ship speeds would generally be reduced from 37 to 20 knots.  Logistics was 
also a limiting factor.  The patrol gunboats could spend two weeks at sea without any 
replenishment if necessary; however, underway time was usually limited to a few days 
between port visits.  Food and fuel could be re-supplied by underway replenishment 
(UNREP), but the major limiting factor was in the quantity of freshwater that could be 
made onboard.  Even though the gunboat crews were small, the ships evaporators could 
not keep the crew adequately supplied; a particularly troubling problem. (Donaldson, 
2003) 
  In Vietnam, the ASHEVILLE class became an effective river gunboat; however, 
it found little use for its high speed.  In 1971, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Elmo Zumwalt, directed Project Sixty, a quick look at new ways of using U.S. warships.  
One of the conclusions was to use the ASHEVILLE class ships to trail Soviet naval 
formations in the Mediterranean, even though they did not carry enough armament to 
successfully protect themselves against the Soviet ships.  Efforts were undertaken to 
increase the payload; however, the outcome was a loss of three to four knots in speed.  As 
a result, only four of the seventeen ships built remained in this role.  Three ships were 
moved to the Naval Base at Little Creek, Virginia, three ships were transferred to U.S. 
allies, and the remaining seven were assigned to gunboat duty patrolling the Marianas 
trust territory from Guam.  By the early 1980s, all of the ASHEVILLE class ships were 
either decommissioned or transferred to U.S. allies. 
The ASHEVILLE class experienced many problems throughout its life cycle.  In 
the design process, the tradeoff between speed, payload and range was a great source of 
debate and resulted in delayed construction.  Each ship cost approximately $5 million, 
five times greater than the initial $1 million projection, and high maintenance costs made 
them expensive to operate once commissioned.  Additionally, sea keeping problems 
prevented them from capitalizing on the high speeds for which they were designed.  The 
changes in missions they experienced throughout their service life demonstrated their 
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inability to successfully fulfill the primary mission for which they were designed.  Even 
though the majority of them did end up on gunboat patrol missions based out of Guam, 
the Navy was already looking at a cheaper and more effective replacement: the 
PEGASUS class missile hydrofoils. 
 
B. PEGASUS CLASS MISSILE HYDROFOILS (PHM) 
Once it was determined the ASHEVILLE class ships were too expensive and 
unable to satisfactorily perform their required missions, the Navy immediately turned 
their research efforts toward the development of a new small combatant that would 
replace the expensive patrol gunboats.  The goal was to develop a high-speed ship with 
improved all weather performance, reduced maintenance costs, good sea keeping ability 
and increased operational availability.  By the late 1960s, missile technology provided 
new hope that a large amount of anti-ship firepower could be generated from aboard a 
small ship.  Due to its projected small size, good sea keeping ability and sustained rough 
water speed, it was believed these small ships could lie in wait, conduct a quick attack 
and retreat at high speeds.  As a result, they would be able to successfully perform 
blockades, intercept missions and offshore patrols as necessary. 
The missile hydrofoil was initially turned to in the late 1960s as an attractive 
replacement for the ASHEVILLE class gunboat, particularly in the Mediterranean.  The 
initial concept was to establish a squadron of missile hydrofoils, each carrying a different 
modular weapons package, capable of functioning collectively as one multi-mission 
conventional warship.  In May 1967, the Naval Ship Systems Command (NavShips) was 
asked to research a hydrofoil design capable of protecting coastal installations, surface 
shipping, and amphibious operations against fast-attack boats and conducting covert 
operations, reconnaissance and surveillance.  By November 1968, even though nobody 
knew how hydrofoils would perform in realistic environments, the Navy was considering 
a 100-150 ton missile hydrofoil capable of achieving 45 knots sustained in sea state 5.  
Ship design was focused on high speed, a small crew and reduced life cycle costs; 
however, the total cost per ship was already estimated at $10.2 million ($18 million for 
the prototype).  Compared to the cost of the ASHEVILLE class ships, this was an 
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increase of more than 100%, however, the Navy believed they would see the savings in 
operating costs. 
In November 1969, operations and technical personnel from eleven North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations met to devise a joint fast patrol boat 
program with the goal  of designing a ship that would offer a significant speed advantage 
over the large Soviet missile ships when operating in rough weather.  Admiral Zumwalt 
made the missile hydrofoil an important element of his Project Sixty program, and in 
1970 NavShips received authorization from the Secretary of Defense to continue the 
design process.  At this time, however, NavShips was still far from a prototype as 
problems were being encountered with regards to the tradeoffs between speed, 
endurance, and payload.  Since the limited size of the ship restricted the weight of the 
weapon systems to only 18 tons, it was determined that a modular weapons package 
concept would still be required in order to achieve a foil-borne range of 600 nautical 
miles and a hull-borne range of 2,000 nautical miles.  Table 4 contains proposals for the 
various missile hydrofoil modular mission payload systems. (Friedman, 1987) 
 
Modular Weapons Package Payload 
Electronic Warfare Demountable deckhouse with required equipment 
Anti-Surface Warfare 
(Coastal) 
Sonobuoys and torpedoes, with a high-speed, two-mode 
sonar to be developed later. 
Anti-Surface (Gun) Warfare OTO-Melara 76mm gun, with a lightweight 3-inch/.50-
caliber gun as a fallback 
Anti-Surface (Missile) 6 Standard or Harpoon missiles in fixed launchers 
Anti-Air Warfare 15 Sparrows in fixed launchers 
Special Operations Deck-mounted module for 14 SEALS 
NATO Undetermined gun plus missile combination 
Table 4.   Proposed Missile Hydrofoil Modular Mission Payload Systems 
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In mid-1970, the Secretary of Defense decided the United States would lead the 
NATO fast patrol boat program, and in November the United States formally offered a 
142-ton hydrofoil with a maximum speed of 48 knots at sea state 0 and a range of 860 
nautical miles foil-borne or 1,500 nautical miles hull-borne.  Based on a forty-two ship 
purchase, the estimated cost was only $3.2 million per ship ($6.9 million for the lead 
ship).  In March 1971, the United States announced that the initial purchase would consist 
of eight missile hydrofoils with an additional thirty being purchased between fiscal years 
1973-1977.  The problem was that the modular design was discarded.  Therefore, the 
single hull now had to accommodate a variety of weapons systems.  As a result, the ship 
had to be made larger and in turn, required more fuel and power.  By late 1971, the 
missile hydrofoil grew to a displacement of 160 tons while total armament weight had 
increased from 18 to 21 tons.  Its 40 tons of fuel resulted in a foil-borne range of 750 
nautical miles and hull-borne range of 1,500 nautical miles.  Since many conventional 
ships outgrow the future growth margins designed into them, the gradual growth of the 
missile hydrofoils was a concern since foil-borne operations provided for a relatively 
small growth margin.  As a result, the Navy quickly realized their desire to outfit the 
missile hydrofoils with the Harpoon Missile System, 76 millimeter anti-destroyer gun and 
the Sea Sparrow Missile System was going to be a problem. 
In order to save time and money, the Navy chose sole-source procurement, and a 
contract was awarded to Boeing in November 1971.  In 1972, letters of intent were 
received from Italy and Germany; however, all other NATO participants dropped out of 
the program or reverted to observer status.  While the Naval Ship Engineering Center 
(NAVSEC) completed a feasibility study of a 150-160 ton missile hydrofoil in May 1972, 
Boeing’s design, aimed at both U.S. and German markets, turned out to be much larger.  
NAVSEC argued that the Boeing proposal, with its relatively short range, large payload 
and high cost (approximately 25-35 percent more than that of their 160-ton design) was 
too large for the Navy.  In the end, it was the Boeing design, the PEGASUS class missile 
hydrofoil, which was selected, mainly for its greater growth margins.  Table 5 contains 
PEGASUS class ship specifications (Pike, 2002 and Friedman, 1987) and Table 6 












Speed      
(knots) 
Range     
(nm / kts) 
Crew 
Hull-borne 145 28 23.21 255 12 1110 / 10 25 
Foil-borne 133 28 8.8 255 50 400 / 50 25 
Table 5.   PEGASUS Class Ship Specifications 
 
Note:  1. With foils extended.  Hull-borne draft with foils retracted is 6.2 feet. 
 
 
Mission Profile Armament 
Anti-Surface Warfare - Eight Harpoon Missiles 
- One 76 millimeter Rapid Fire Gun 
Anti-Air Warfare None 
Anti-Submarine Warfare None 
Table 6.   PEGASUS Class Payload 
 
 
By 1974, the PEGASUS class program encountered severe cost overruns and a 
decision was made to reduce the number of ships in the program from thirty to twenty-
five.  The following year brought more funding problems for the PEGASUS class, and a 
decision was made to further reduce the number of ships in the program to six.  In 1976, 
construction on the USS HERCULES (PHM-2) was suspended in order to obtain enough 
money to complete the lead ship, USS PEGASUS (PHM-1).  By 1977, the PEGASUS 
program incurred such a cost growth ($13.2 million) that the last of the six ships, USS 
GEMINI (PHM-6), had to be built without armament. (Jenkins, 1995)   
As the ships were commissioned in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Navy 
made numerous attempts at a trial deployment to the Mediterranean; however, these were 
prevented by frequent system failures and a long lead-time for repair parts.  Since the 
PEGASUS class was too small to support itself and mobile logistics support was 
unavailable, it could not operate in waters far from home.  Just as USS GRAHAM 
COUNTY (LST 1176) was modified to provide necessary logistics support for the 
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ASHEVILLE class, USS WOOD COUNTY (LST 1178) was considered essential for 
logistics support of the PEGASUS class ships if their deployment to the Mediterranean 
was going to be successful.  While the fiscal year 1978 budget provided the necessary 
funding ($42.8 million) for the conversion, the poor condition of USS WOOD 
COUNTY’s propulsion plant was not taken into consideration.  After reviewing the 
proposal, it was determined the cost of plant replacement plus modification was 
excessive, and as such, the conversion was cancelled, even though it was previously 
determined that a logistics support ship was vital for the success of the PEGASUS class. 
As a result, hopes for a Mediterranean deployment were abandoned and operations 
beyond the Caribbean were never scheduled.  Even though funding was the official basis 
for cancellation, it seems more likely that the program had lost support and was destined 
for failure. (Jenkins, 1995) 
 As with the ASHEVILLE class, it seemed once again the strategic requirements 
of the United States Navy were not met with the development of the missile hydrofoils.  
Due to the inability to incorporate a modular weapons capability into the missile 
hydrofoil design, the squadron concept never came to fruition and the missile hydrofoils 
limited role was not in keeping with the Navy’s emphasis on multi-purpose ships that 
were more adaptable to the full spectrum of naval operations.  On July 30, 1993, the 
PEGASUS class program came to an end as all six were decommissioned. 
 
C. CYCLONE CLASS PATROL COASTAL SHIPS (PC) 
In 1990, the Navy awarded a contract to Bollinger Shipyards Incorporated for 
construction of eight patrol coastal ships.  A follow-on contract for five additional ships 
was awarded in July 1991; in October 1997 Bollinger was awarded a contract to build a 
fourteenth patrol coastal ship.  Construction of the ships was funded by the United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and as such, the ships were assigned to the 
Naval Special Warfare Command under the cognizance of Special Boat Squadron ONE 
(Coronado, CA) and Special Boat Squadron TWO (Little Creek, VA).  The initial 
mission of the patrol coastal ships was to conduct Maritime Special Operations, to 
include maritime interdiction operations, forward presence, escort operations, 
noncombatant evacuation, foreign internal defense, long-range Special Operations Forces 
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(SOF) insertion/extraction, tactical swimmer operations, reconnaissance, intelligence 
collection, operational deception, and SOF support as required. (Matyas, 2003)  Table 6 












Speed       
(knots) 
Range     
(nm / kts) 
Crew 
PC 1 - PC 13 170 25 7.9 341 35 2000 39 
PC 14 179 25 8.5 392 35 2900 39 




Mission Profile Armament 
Anti-Surface Warfare - 25mm Machine Guns 
- Five .50-caliber Machine Guns 
- Two 40mm automatic grenade 
launchers 
- Two M-60 machine guns. 
Anti-Air Warfare Stinger Missiles 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Sonar transducer retracted within the hull at 
speeds above 14 knots 
Table 8.   CYCLONE Class Payload 
 
 
The goal of the CYCLONE class program was to produce ships that provided the 
Navy with a fast, reliable platform that was able to respond to emergent requirements in a 
shallow-water environment.  However, the Navy quickly realized they had once again 
embarked upon another problematic high-speed ship program.  As with the previously 
discussed high-speed ship designs, the full displacement grew during construction.  The 
focus on speed during the design process resulted in damaging tradeoffs to range and 
payload.  Even though the patrol coastal ships are much larger than their predecessors, 
they only carry about the same payload and their combat systems and ammunition 
allowance do not compare well with similar ships in most other navies.  Even though they 
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are capable of refueling at sea using astern refueling rigs, they only have a 10-day 
endurance, which is extremely limited for a ship its size.  In order to support the few 
deployments they made to the Mediterranean, they require a temporarily shore-based 
Maintenance Support Team that pre-deployed with three 20-foot vans for spare parts and 
repair work.  If these problems weren’t bad enough, it was later discovered that they were 
too large for the close inshore work for which they were intended. 
Due to the inability to successfully fulfill the missions for which they were 
designed, plans to build three additional patrol coastal ships (PC 15 through PC 17) were 
terminated and the CYCLONE class ships were slated for decommissioning in 2002.  
However, after the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., there 
appeared to be a need for these ships in providing homeland defense.  On November 5, 
2001, it was announced that under OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE, five CYCLONE class 
ships were to be used for U.S. coastal patrol and maritime homeland security operations 
under the tactical control of the Coast Guard.  As a result, they were tailored for maritime 
homeland security missions and have been employed jointly with the U.S. Coast Guard to 
assist in protecting U.S. coastlines, ports and waterways against potential terrorist attacks.  
The lead ship of the class, USS CYCLONE (PC 1), was decommissioned and turned over 
to the U.S. Coast Guard on February 28, 2000.  As of now, no decisions have been made 
as to the decommissioning dates for the remaining CYCLONE class ships. 
 
D. VALUE AND LIMITATION OF SPEED 
Throughout Naval history, the development of small combatants in the United 
States has been driven by two factors: national strategy and technology, particularly the 
technology of high speed. (Friedman, 1987)  While it is clear small ship design should be 
driven by national strategy, the concept of speed has always been a source of great 
debate. 
It must be plain to everyone who has ever taken part in any discussion on 
speed…that those who favour very high speed…are extremely sensitive 
on those points, and are usually ready to meet even a historical and 
undisputed statement with a vigorous rejoinder, as though an appeal to 
history were regarded as a controversion of their opinions.  This deserves 
a good deal of consideration. (The Institution of Naval Architects, 1905) 
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Those who believe speed is critical to successful Naval operations argue high 
speed enables ships to arrive in theater faster and increase maneuverability within the 
assigned operating area.  On station, some of the tactical benefits of high speed would 
seem to include decreased Special Operations Forces insertion and extraction times, 
increased flexibility in supporting Ship-to-Shore and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 
operations, quick attacks against an enemy. and increased ability to evade enemy ships 
and weapons.  Some proponents of speed may refer to war games and computer 
simulations as proof that speed is, in fact, a tactical advantage when it comes to Naval 
operations.  
Speed has always been of value in warfare, and daily it is being revalued 
yet further.  If the value of speed is increasing, then those factors, sectors 
or forces which slow us down must either change or cease to exist.  
(Cebrowski, 1998) 
Others argue high speed is not a tactical advantage.  They state history has shown 
that high speed often appears so attractive that the possibility of obtaining it, even at great 
expense, seems to alone justify the construction of high-speed, small combatants.  Often 
these proposals for new high-speed ships demonstrated the conflict between an attractive 
technology and naval requirements and turned out to be nothing more than solutions 
seeking problems. (Friedman, 1987)  The lessons learned from the ASHEVILLE, 
PEGASUS and CYCLONE classes seem to support this idea. 
Whether or not speed is tactically useful may not be the right question to ask.  
Perhaps, the more appropriate question is whether or not it is possible to overcome the 
limitations which have, throughout history, prevented previous high-speed ship designs 
from successfully capitalizing on any value that speed potentially offers.  One reason the 
ASHEVILLE, PEGASUS and CYCLONE classes were all unable to meet the high-speed 
mission requirements for which they were designed was due to poor sea keeping in rough 
waters.  Figure 2 demonstrates the impact of wave height on speed: as wave height 
increases, speed significantly decreases. (Lockheed Martin, 2002)  While wave height has 
proven itself to be a major limitation on speed, it is not the only one.  The need for the 
U.S. Navy to operate in potentially hostile waters far from home requires that ships be 
capable of long range, high endurance, and delivery of ordnance on target when 
necessary.  Considering the small size of these previous high-speed ships and existing 
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constraints in technology, range and payload were always sacrificed in order to achieve 
high speeds.  With endurance rarely exceeding fourteen days, frequent replenishment was 
necessary if these ships were to remain mission capable.  Since the U.S. Navy did not 
have mobile logistics assets capable of resupplying these ships as often as needed, it 
made it nearly impossible to support them in their operating areas. 
 
Figure 2.   Impact of Wave Height on Ship Speed 
 
We now stand, according to Sir Reginald Custance, in the position that 
there is no absolute proof of the value of speed. He is an officer of the 
largest experience in the handing of fleets, and he tells us that the 
experiments so far made have not conclusively established one view or the 
other, and that he considers it is possible to reach a definite conclusion by 
properly conducted and well arranged, exhaustive experiments. (The 





From the ASHEVILLE, PEGASUS and CYCLONE class high-speed ship 
programs, we have learned there are, in fact, limitations to speed; however, the question 
regarding the value of speed, relative to the factors one must sacrifice to obtain it, 
remains.  War games and simulation may provide insights into the value of speed; 
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III. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 The Littoral Combat Ship is scheduled to be a member of the family of future 
surface combatants in support of the Sea Shield component of Sea Power 21.  Its 
proposed contribution to Sea Shield is through its high-speed capability coupled with its 
ability to conduct a variety of peacetime and combat missions.  In addition, the Littoral 
Combat Ship is proposed to be an enabler of Sea Basing by providing security for Joint 
assets and by acting as a logistics element for joint mobility and sustainment. The Littoral 
Combat Ship is envisioned to be a seaframe, serving much the same purpose as an 
airframe for a reconfigurable aircraft.  It will serve as a platform for modular mission 
packages that can be changed, modified or removed in a short period of time.  Logistics 
support will be self-contained and possess the capability of supporting additional 
personnel to augment the core crew as required for modular mission package support and 
additional tasks such as messing, administration and medical support. 
In this chapter, the Littoral Combat Ship concept of operations is discussed, 
critical design parameters are listed and a model is created to estimate the Littoral 
Combat Ship size and endurance.  Information regarding Littoral Combat Ship operations 
was obtained from the Naval Warfare Development Command Littoral Combat Ship 
Concept of Operations. (Navy Warfare Development Command, 2003) 
 
A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The Littoral Combat Ship is designed to accomplish missions inside the littorals 
in order to support the national strategy tenet of littoral dominance.  It will effectively 
operate throughout the continuum of operations as part of a distributed force.  It is 
networked to off-board systems and to power projecting elements, from Carrier Strike 
Groups (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) to other Service capabilities for 
influencing events at sea and shore.  Effective operations in the littorals are characterized 
by speed, agility, and integration with off board modular systems, survivability and 
signature control. 
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In order to operate effectively, the Littoral Combat Ship must be capable of 
limited independent operations, interdependent operations as part of a littoral operations 
force or integrated operations with multi-mission fleet forces such as Carrier and 
Expeditionary Strike Groups.  In the self-deployable mode, a single forward deployed 
Littoral Combat Ship will be capable of responding rapidly and conducting a wide range 
of mobility missions such as Special Operations Forces (SOF) support, logistics (LOG), 
Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP), Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO), Sea 
Line of Communication (SLOC) patrols, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), 
Humanitarian Assistance (HA), and Medical Support (MED).  The Littoral Combat Ship 
must be capable of transiting to the assigned operating area without having to rely on 
valuable and scarce Combat Logistic Force (CLF) ships or an ever-present logistics 
support ship.  A self-deployment range of at least 3,500 nautical miles is desired as it 
would ensure a quick transfer to and from the theater of operations.  In the interdependent 
operations mode, a number of Littoral Combat Ships would be forward deployed to 
maintain a continuous presence in critical theaters of operations.  They will build the 
situational awareness in the littorals in anticipation of sanction enforcement, forced entry, 
information operations, strike operations and land warfare.  In the integrated operations 
mode, several Littoral Combat Ships, with tailored mission configurations, will deploy 
with a CSG or ESG to provide vanguard scouting, pouncing support, and other tasking as 
directed.   
The two primary mission categories for the Littoral Combat Ship are Focused 
Missions and Continuing Missions.  During Focused Missions, the Littoral Combat Ship 
will employ reconfigurable modules tailored to specific missions such as littoral Anti-
Submarine Warfare, Mine Warfare and Anti-Surface Warfare.  As the Littoral Combat 
Ship will generally operate as part of a distributed force of many Littoral Combat Ships, 
groups of ships may be discretely configured so that more than one mission is conducted 
throughout the force.  An additional Focused Mission is formalized logistics, which 
would include inter-theater and intra-theater lift and other joint logistics missions.  Table 




Mission Profile Armament 
Anti-Submarine Warfare - MH-60 R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter 
- SPARTAN USV 
Mine Warfare - MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter 
- SPARTAN USV 
- RMS USV 
- LMRS UUV  
Anti-Surface Warfare - MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter 
- AH-58D Army Attack Helicopter 1 
- SPARTAN USV 
Anti-Air Warfare - AH-58D Army Attack Helicopter 
Self Defense - Four .50-caliber M2 Machine Guns 
- Four M-60 Machine Guns 
Table 9.   Littoral Combat Ship Focus Mission Profile and Payload 
 
Note: 1.  The Army AH-58D Warrior aircraft is a version of the Army OH-58D Kiowa 
Warrior with air-to-air and air-to-surface armament installed. 
 
During Continuing Missions, the Littoral Combat Ship will conduct intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (performed by the Fire Scout VT-UAV) or participate in 
any of the previously listed mobility missions while providing for its own self-defense.  
The core capabilities of the Littoral Combat Ship (sensing; command, control and 
communications; processing capability; and modular weapons) will support these 
continuing missions, which may or may not be conducted in a distributed manner.   
The Littoral Combat Ship will contain mission systems and weapons that provide 
both core self-defense capabilities and the necessary compatibility with off-board sensors 
and networks.  The mission systems will have four components: the host Littoral Combat 
Ship platform, its organic associated mission systems (installed seaframe systems), its 
networking capability, and the off-board sensors/vehicles (modular mission packages).  
Elements of mission modules will be designed to overlap in their applicability, and 
reconfiguration is anticipated to be a relatively simple and rapid task conducted at sea via 
Conventional Replenishment (CONREP) or Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP), in port 
or in a shipyard type environment.  Replacement or replenishment modules may be flown 
in or pre-staged in theater as necessary. 
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B. CRITICAL DESIGN PARAMETERS 
Table 10 contains the Littoral Combat Ship critical design parameters listed in the 
Surface Warfare Directorate Ship Systems Division Preliminary Design Interim 
Requirements Document. (Surface Warfare Directorate, 2003)  
 
Category Threshold Level Objective Level 
Total Price per Ship Seaframe:  $220 M          
Mission Packages:  $180 M 
Cost less than threshold 
Hull Service Life 20 Years 30 Years 
Draft at Full Displacement 20 feet 10 feet 
Sprint Speed at Full Displacement 40 knots in Sea State 3 1 50 knots in Sea State 3 
Range at Sprint Speed 2 1,000 nautical miles 1,500 nautical miles 
Range at Economical Speed 2 3,500 nautical miles, speed 
greater than 18 knots 
4,300 nautical miles, speed 
greater than 20 knots 
Aviation Support Embark and hangar one       
MH-60R/S and VT-UAVs 
Embark and hangar one MH-
60R/S and VT-UAVs 
Aircraft Launch/Recover Sea State 4 Sea State 5 
Watercraft Launch/Recover Sea State 3 within 45 minutes Sea State 4 within 15 minutes 
Mission Package Boat Type 11 Meter RHIB 40-foot High Speed Boat 
Time for Mission Package 
Change-Out to full operational 
capability 
4 days 1 day 
Provisions 336 hours (14 days) 504 hours (21 days) 
Underway Replenishment Modes CONREP/VERTREP/RAS CONREP/VERTREP/RAS 
Mission Package Payload 3  177.2 long tons 206.7 long tons 
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Core Crew Size 50 15 
Accommodations (crew and 
embarked personnel)  
75 75 
Operational Availability 0.85 0.95 
Table 10.   Littoral Combat Ship Critical Design Parameters 
 
Note: 1.  Sea State parameters are defined in Appendix A. 
 2.  Includes payload for required range. 
 3.  Includes the weight of fuel required to operate the mission package. 
 
C. MODEL DESCRIPTION AND FORMULATION 
The purpose of the model is to calculate the estimated size and endurance for the 
Littoral Combat Ship in order that the logistical implications of speed, endurance, and 
payload tradeoffs can be studied.   Since the Littoral Combat Ship is still in the 
conceptual phase, a seaframe suitable for conducting missions listed by the Navy Warfare 
Development Command (NWDC) in the Littoral Combat Ship Concept of Operations 
had to be utilized. (Navy Warfare Development Command, 2003)  The lack of logistical 
analysis for non-traditional hull forms coupled with current military testing of and data 
availability for the Joint Venture (HSV-X1) high-speed, wave-piercing catamaran 
resulted in the selection of the Joint Venture as the Littoral Combat Ship surrogate for 
model development.  The model is developed using Microsoft Office EXCEL.  It is 
subdivided into seven sections: Seaframe Data, Seaframe Systems, Modular Mission 
Packages, Ship’s Gear Weight, Full Displacement Calculation, Endurance Calculation 
and Fuel Replenishment Requirement Calculation.  Tables 11 through 13 contain 
conversion factors used throughout the model. 
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Table 11.   Weight Conversion Factors 
 
 




Table 13.   Full Displacement Calculation Conversion Factors 
 
 
1. Seaframe Data 
Ship specifications for the Joint Venture include length, beam, draft, seaframe and 
maximum displacement, speed, maximum range, and storage area.  Seaframe 
displacement is defined as the weight of the hull, self-defense machine guns (total of 
eight), and all installed propulsion systems.  It excludes installed seaframe systems 
(weapons systems, sensors, command and control systems) and deadweight.  Deadweight 
is defined as the total weight of the crew, embarked personnel and their effects; fresh 
water; stores and provisions; fuel; ordnance; modular mission packages; and any 
Weight Conversion Factors:        
1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2046 pounds
1 long ton (lt) = 2240 pounds
kg to lt conversion factor = 0.000984
Marginal Growth Factor = 1.20
Storage Area Conversion Factors:
1 square meter (sq m) = 1.196 sq yards
1 square yard (sq yd) = 9.000 sq feet
sq m to sq ft conversion factor = 10.764
Marginal Growth Factor = 1.10
Full Displacement Calculation Conversion Factors:
1 gallon = 3.7854 liters
1 ounce = 0.0078125 gallons
1 pound = 16 ounces
1 short ton = 2000 pounds
1 long ton = 2240 pounds
1 short ton = 1.12 long tons
Crew Member / Embarked Personnel = 0.15 short ton
Ship Growth Margin per Person  = 3 long tons / person
Payload Weight Factor = 15%
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additional items of consumable or variable load.  Maximum displacement is defined as 
the maximum weight of the ship, which includes the seaframe and its installed systems 
and all deadweight.  Storage area is defined as the amount of space available for installed 
seaframe systems and modular mission packages.  Military useful storage area was 
determined based on the Transportability Analysis conducted by the Military Traffic 
Management Command’s Transportation Engineering Agency. (Atwood and Delucia, 
2002)  Since all seaframe and modular mission package systems listed in the Navy 
Warfare Development Command Littoral Ship Concept of Operations are of a height less 
than that of the Joint Venture storage decks, storage areas are calculated in square feet for 
area vice cubed feet for volume.  Table 14 contains JOINT VENTURE ship 
specifications. 
 
Table 14.   JOINT VENTURE Ship Specifications 
 
Notes: 1.  Maximum draft is 13 feet. 
2.  Storage area with the Portable Stern Ramp (562 square feet) onboard is  




2. Seaframe Systems 
The seaframe systems consist of all weapon systems, sensors, and command and 
control systems that have been used by the Navy as surrogate systems to be permanently 
installed aboard the Littoral Combat Ship. (Navy Warfare Development Command, 2002)  
This section contains the number of proposed systems, unit weight and unit area for each 
system.  The total weight and area for each system are calculated and added to determine 
the total weight and storage area of all seaframe systems.  During ship design and 














Speed       
(knots) 
Maximum 
Range      




313.2 87.3 12.11 922.3 1671.4 48 2400 / 35 30 121142 
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assumptions, and additional unforeseen factors.  Allowances, which are excesses of some 
characteristic beyond known needs, are intentionally built into the ship to be consumed 
during its life.  Figure 3 demonstrates margins and allowances over the life cycle of a 
ship. (Calvano, 2003)  In order to account for these margins and allowances in the model, 
a marginal growth of 20% for system weight and 10% for system area are added to 
seaframe system weight and area totals. 
 
Figure 3.   Margins and Allowances Over Ship Life Cycle  
 
Table 15 contains a list of the proposed Littoral Combat Ship seaframe systems 
and their associated weight and storage area. 
The following formulation is used to determine total weight and space 










Total Weight Number of Systems Unit Weight
Total Storage Area Number of Systems Unit Area
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Table 15.   Proposed Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe Systems 
 
 
3. Ship’s Gear Weight 
Ship’s gear consists of items necessary for support of the seaframe.  Table 16 
contains a list of ship gear aboard JOINT VENTURE and its associated weight. 
 




Ship's Gear Item Number Unit Weight Total Weight
(long tons) (long tons)
Caterpillar Container: 1 3.6 3.6
Incat Container: 1 4.5 4.5
Portable Ramp: 1 6.6 6.6
ISU-90 W-Locker: 1 2.1 2.1
ISU-90 A-Locker: 1 2.1 2.1
Oil drums, misc items: 1 8.9 8.9
Incat Support Van: 1 2.7 2.7
Forklift: 1 6.4 6.4
GUV 1 0.6 0.6
Generator Set: 2 2.0 3.9
RHIB: 1 0.7 0.7
TOTAL: 42.2
Weapon Systems, Sensors and 
Command & Control Systems
Number Total Weight Total Weight including Marginal Growth Total Storage Area
Total Storage Area 
including Marginal 
Growth
(long tons) (long tons) (square feet) (square feet)
Mk 15 CIWS Block 1B Gun Mount 1 6.47 7.8 131.3 144.5
CIWS Support 1 0.86 1.0 117.3 129.1
Mk 31 RAM Guided Missile System 
Launcher, above deck 1 5.11 6.1 103.3 113.7
RAM, below deck 1 0.89 1.1 10.8 11.8
Mk 53 Mod 4 Decoy Launch System (4 
NULKA-SRBOC & 2 SRBOC launchers) 1 10.00 12.0 158.2 174.1
Advanced Surface / Air Search Radar 1 1.00 1.2 20.0 22.0
Electro Optical Sight System 1 1.00 1.2 20.0 22.0
Link 16 (CDLMS & JTIDS) 1 1.60 1.9 45.2 49.7
AN/USG-2(V) Co-operative Engagement 
Capability (CEC) (Receive Only) 1 1.57 1.9 58.1 63.9
TOTAL: 34.2 TOTAL: 730.7
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Ships Gear j jTotal Weight Number of Item Unit Weight
j j Ship s Gear Items Listed in Table
  =    




4. Modular Mission Packages 
Modular mission packages consist of all manned and unmanned vehicles that are 
not permanently installed in the seaframe.  These systems are designed to support the 
modular architecture of the Littoral Combat Ship.  They provide flexible mission 
capability to meet different primary, secondary or alternate missions and the future ability 
to incorporate new technology for given mission functions.  This section contains the 
number of proposed modular mission package systems, unit weight and unit area for each 
system.  The total weight and area for each system are calculated and added to determine 
the total weight and storage area of all modular mission systems.  As previously applied 
to the seaframe systems, a marginal growth of 20% for system weight and 10% for 
system area are added to the modular mission package weight and area totals in order to 
account for modular mission package margins and allowances.  Data regarding the five 
modular mission packages used in the model was obtained from the NWDC Littoral 
Combat Ship Concept of Operations draft and Surface Warfare Directorate Ship Systems 
Division Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document. (Navy Warfare 
Development Command, 2002 and Surface Warfare Directorate, 2003).  They include the 
MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter (MMH), AH-58D Warrior Helicopter, Fire Scout 
Vertical Takeoff-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VT-UAV), Remote Mine-hunting System 
(RMS), Spartan Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV), and Long-term Mine 
Reconnaissance System (LMRS).  Table 17 contains proposed Littoral Combat Ship 
modular mission packages, and Table 18 provides the weight and storage area of each 
modular mission package.  The total storage area of all seaframe systems, all modular 
mission packages, and the onboard ramp is 8,769 square feet, which falls below the 







RMS Spartan USV LMRS  
- Support for 1 
- Payload 
- Fuel 
- Support for 2 
- Payload 
- Fuel 












- Support for 1 
- Payload 




- Support for 2 
- Payload 
- No fuel required   
(battery powered) 





Table 18.   Modular Mission Package Weights and Storage Areas 
 
 
The following formulation is used to determine total weight and space 











Total Weight Number of Modular Mission Packages Unit Weight
Total Storage Area Number of Modular Mission Packages Unit Area
k k MH R S AH
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Modular Mission Package Number Total Weight
Total Weight 
including Marginal 




(long tons) (long tons) (square feet) (square feet)
MH-60R/S 1 75.2 90.2 1551.6 1706.8
AH-58D 2 22.0 26.4 2095.5 2305.1
Fire Scout VT-UAV 3 13.5 16.2 1505.9 1656.5
RMS 1 27.6 33.1 398.3 438.1
SPARTAN USV 1 35.8 43.0 1083.9 1192.3
LMRS 2 7.4 8.9 161.5 177.6
TOTAL: 217.8 TOTAL: 7476.3
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5. Full Displacement Calculation 
This portion of the model calculates the full displacement of the proposed Littoral 
Combat Ship by adding the deadweight to the light displacement.  The light displacement 
is calculated by adding the displacement of the seaframe and all seaframe installed 
systems.  The deadweight is calculated by adding the weight of the crew, embarked 
personnel and their effects; fresh water; stores and provisions; fuel; lube oil; ship’s gear; 
ordnance; and all modular mission packages installed aboard the seaframe (this varies 
depending on the assigned mission).  The weight of the crew and embarked personnel is 
calculated by multiplying the total number of crew and embarked personnel by the 
average weight per person.  According to the critical design parameters, there will be 
between fifteen and fifty crewmembers aboard the Littoral Combat Ship.  During the 
Navy’s testing of the JOINT VENTURE, there were a total of thirty-one crewmembers.  
However, the lessons learned stated the fast pace of JOINT VENTURE testing operations 
along with duty and watch-standing requirements were too demanding for the current 
crew size, and as such, recommended a crew size of forty. (Beierl, 2002)  Since it appears 
these added demands were due to the Navy testing a ship that wasn’t specifically 
designed for Littoral Combat Ship operations, it seems reasonable the majority of these 
problems will be resolved during the actual design process.  As a result, a crew size of 
thirty-five is used as it provides an additional four personnel to compensate for any 
unforeseen manning requirements.  The critical design parameters state the Littoral 
Combat Ship will be able to provide accommodations for up to seventy-five personnel, 
which includes personnel to support the various modular mission systems and other 
passengers as a result of the assigned Littoral Combat Ship mission (examples include 
Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, Humanitarian Support and Medical Support).  
Since the number of personnel required to support all modular mission systems has not 
been determined, it is assumed to be approximately 25% of the total number of 
passengers.  As a result, 18 personnel are used as the number of embarked personnel in 
the model full displacement calculation.  Adding the number of crewmembers and 
embarked personnel results in a total of 53 personnel assigned onboard the Littoral 
Combat Ship.  The weight of crew and embarked personnel effects; fresh water; and 
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stores and provisions is calculated by multiplying the total number of crew and embarked 
personnel by the ship growth margin per person. 
The weight of fuel depends on the amount being carried onboard.  The JOINT 
VENTURE has four Day tanks and two Long-Range tanks, for a total carrying capacity 
of 567,580 liters.  Fuel weight is calculated by converting the amount of fuel being 
carried in liters to tons.   Table 19 contains data for the Littoral Combat Ship fuel 
capacity and weight. 
 
Table 19.    Littoral Combat Ship Fuel Capacity and Associated Weight 
 
The weight of lube oil and ship’s gear is obtained from the Transportation Engineering 
Agency Transportability Analysis.   (Atwood and Delucia, 2002)   
The amount of ordnance depends on the installed weapon systems and mission 
profile for which the Littoral Combat Ship is being configured.  Typically, the weight of 
a modern warship’s mission payload (consisting of armament and ordnance) makes up 
ten to fifteen percent of its full displacement. (Kelley, 2002)  As a result, the total 
payload weight is calculated by multiplying the maximum displacement by fifteen 
percent.  Since the ordnance required for modular missions is included in each mission 
package, the objective level weight for mission module payload, contained in Table 9, is 
used for the total weight of modular mission packages.  The weight of ordnance for 
seaframe systems is determined by subtracting the weight of all seaframe systems and 




Fuel Capacity Fuel Weight Fuel Weight
(liters) (pounds) (long tons)
4 Day Tanks: 174880 369588.42 164.99
2 Long-Range Tanks: 392700 829925.50 370.50
Combined Tanks: 567580 1199513.92 535.50
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The following formulation is used to determine the full displacement of the 
Littoral Combat Ship: 
 
     
*
*
LCS Sea frame Seaframe Systems
Crew Crew Member
Embarked Personnel Embar
Light Displacement Total Weight Total Weight
Weight Number of Crew Members Unit Weight




 =  +  
=     





Total Number of Personnel Number of Crew Members Number of Embarked Personnel
Weight Total Number of Personnel Ship Growth Margin Per Person
Weight Amount of
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Ordnance Payload Seaframe Systems Mo
Fuel Carried Onboard Fuel Weight Conversion Factor
Weight long tons
Weight Maximum Displacement Payload Weight Factor
Weight Weight Weight Weight
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LCS Crew Embarked Personnel Effects Stores Provisions Fuel
Lube Oil Ships Gear Ordnance Modula
Deadweight Weight Weight Weight Weight
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                         + + + r Mission Packages
LCS LCS LCSFull Displacement Light Displacement Deadweight
  




6. Endurance Calculation 
In order to calculate the estimated endurance of the Littoral Combat Ship, a fuel 
consumption equation is required.  Table 20 contains JOINT VENTURE fuel 
consumption data. (Beierl, 2002) 
 





Fuel Consumption Rate Displacement Ship Speed Significant Wave Height
(liters / hour) (long tons) (knots) (feet)
1320 1500 15 6
5940 1450 33 7
1445 1350 17 7
5760 1300 36 5
6800 1600 34 7
6600 1300 40 3.5
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In order to obtain the required fuel consumption equation, fuel consumption rate 
is regressed against various combinations of displacement, ship speed and significant 
wave height raised to the first, second and third powers.  Significant wave height is 
defined as the average of the highest one-third of the waves. (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, 2003)  The regression of fuel consumption rate against 
displacement, ship speed3 and significant wave height is selected as the preferred 
regression due to the fact that it is statistically sound and yields the most realistic fuel 
consumption equation with regard to JOINT VENTURE actual range and endurance data.  
Since ship power requirements for displacement hulls increase roughly with the cube of 
speed, this further supports the regression selected for use in the model. (Beierl, 2002)  
Table 21 contains the fuel consumption rate regression statistics. 
 
Table 21.    Fuel Consumption Rate Regression Statistics 
 
The regression demonstrates that increases in displacement, speed and significant 
wave height result in increases in fuel consumption.  This finding is confirmed by the fuel 
consumption discussion in the Navy’s JOINT VENTURE “lessons learned” as it was 
noted fuel consumption increased dramatically when both displacement and significant 
wave height increased. (Beierl, 2002)  Fuel consumption rates are calculated by adding 
the intercept coefficient to the sum of the products of the displacement, speed3, and 
significant wave height coefficients obtained from the regression and their respective 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 32559016.000 10853005.333 176.608 0.006
Residual 2 122904.833 61452.417
Total 5 32681920.833
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -7997.867 1437.562 -5.563 0.031 -14183.203 -1812.531
Displacement 3.281 1.217 2.695 0.114 -1.956 8.518
Speed^3 0.129 0.006 20.867 0.002 0.102 0.155
Significant Wave Height 647.403 128.246 5.048 0.037 95.605 1199.201
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As a result, full displacement of the ship decreases as well.  However, this model uses a 
constant fuel weight during calculations.  The result is a lower bound on endurance since 
fuel consumption would actually decrease as the ship becomes lighter, thereby, 
increasing range. 




Fuel Consumption Rate Full Displacement
Ship Speed AverageWave Height
Endurance Amount of Fuel Carried Onboard Fuel Consumpti
  = − 7997.87 + 3.28∗  +
                                             0.13  +   






Total Fuel Consumed Fuel Consumption Rate Operating Time
l l Mission Profile Speeds
 
  =    





7. Fuel Replenishment Requirement Calculation 
Fuel replenishment requirements depend on the amount of fuel carried onboard, 
the rate at which it is consumed, and reserve level dictated.  On-station speeds and length 
of time on station both depend upon the mission profile for which the Littoral Combat 
Ship is assigned.  Once a minimum fuel level is reached, the ship must break from 
assigned operations in order to replenish its fuel before dropping below the pre-
determined fuel reserve.  For comparison purposes, this thesis uses both 50% and 20% 
fuel reserves during the analysis.  While fuel tanks aboard Navy ships are normally filled 
to 95% capacity, the analysis in this thesis uses a 100% capacity since future Littoral 
Combat Ship fuel tank filling capacity is unknown. 
The amount of fuel available is determined by multiplying the fuel carrying 
capacity by the percent of fuel available for assigned operations, which is calculated by 
subtracting the fuel reserve from 100%.  The total amount of fuel consumed is calculated 
by summing the products of total operating time and fuel consumption rate for each on-
station speed as listed in the mission profile.  The number of required fuel replenishments 
is calculated by dividing the total amount of fuel consumed during a specified mission of 
a set duration by the amount of fuel carried onboard the ship minus the fuel reserve 
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amount.  Maximum time on-station is determined by dividing the mission duration by the 
number of required fuel replenishments.  The fuel capacity depends on the mission 
profile and how much weight has been allocated to fuel with regard to total deadweight 
capacity; a tradeoff between the amount of fuel (range) and the amount of modular 
mission packages and ordnance (payload) carried onboard. 
The following formulation is used in estimating the number of required fuel 
replenishments and maximum time on-station for the Littoral Combat Ship: 
   
/
Amount of  Fuel Available for Use = Fuel Carrying Capacity * (100% - Fuel Reserve)
Number of Fuel Replenishments Required =
Total Amount of Fuel Consumed Amount of Fuel Availble for Use
Time On S
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IV. ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the model developed in the previous chapter is used to study the 
implications of speed, endurance, and payload tradeoffs through an analysis of the impact 
of speed, displacement and significant wave height on fuel consumption and endurance.  
In addition, logistics requirements are identified and a discussion of their impact on 
Littoral Combat Ship operations is provided. 
 
A. FULL DISPLACEMENT ANALYSIS 
Table 22 contains the total weight of each modular mission package and its 
respective percentage of the total modular mission package weight.  The total weight of 







Total Weight     
(long tons) 
Percent of Total 
Modular Mission 
Package Weight 
MH-60R/S 1 90.2 41.4% 
AH-58D 2 26.5 12.2% 
Fire Scout VT-UAV 3 16.2 7.4% 
RMS 1 33.1 15.2% 
SPARTAN USV 1 43.0 19.8% 
LMRS 2 8.8 4.0% 
TOTAL  217.8 1 100% 
Table 22.   Modular Mission Package Weights and Percentages 
 
Notes: 1. The total modular mission package weight exceeds both the threshold 
and objective levels in the Littoral Combat Ship critical design parameters 
listed in Table 9. 
 
Currently, due to the applicability of the MH-60R/S, Fire Scout VT-UAV and 
SPARTAN USV to the majority of Littoral Combat Ship missions, there is a desire by 
some Navy officials to permanently embark one of each of these modular mission 
packages aboard every Littoral Combat Ship.  Considering this accounts for 65.23% of 
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the total weight of all modular mission packages, it seems to significantly reduce the 
benefit of incorporating the modular concept into the Littoral Combat Ship design and 
further reduces the amount of weight allocated to carrying additional fuel.  Due to this 
information and the desire to obtain upper bounds on fuel consumption and lower bounds 
on endurance, all modular mission packages are included in the model when calculating 
full displacement.  As such, changes in full displacement are only achieved by varying 
the amount of fuel carried onboard.  Table 23 lists the two Littoral Combat Ship fuel 




Displacement at 174,880-liter 
Carrying Capacity             
Day Tanks Only 
(long tons) 
Displacement at 281,730-liter 
Carrying Capacity            
Day Tanks plus Partial Fill of 
Long-Range Tanks 
(long tons) 
Fuel 165.0 265.8 
Deadweight (Excluding fuel) 231.3 231.3 
Modular Mission Packages 217.8 217.8 
Light Displacement 956.5 956.5 
Full Displacement 1570.6 1671.4 
Table 23.   Littoral Combat Ship Fuel Storage Profiles 
 
 
Table 24 contains the estimated weight of each component of the Littoral Combat 
Ship and the associated light displacement, deadweight and full displacement (listed in 
bold italics).  It includes configurations with and without all modular mission packages 
installed and uses the fuel profiles listed in Table 23.  Without the modular mission 
packages (the mode in which the Littoral Combat Ship can be expected to transit), the full 
displacement is 1352.8 long tons.  This leaves 318.6 long tons of deadweight for 
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additional fuel, which is not enough to fill the Long-Range tanks capable of holding a 
total of 370.5 long tons.  With all modular mission packages embarked, only 100.8 long 
tons of deadweight remain for additional fuel, which again is not enough to fill the two 
long-range tanks.  As a result, even though the full displacement included in the first two 
profiles falls below the Littoral Combat Ship maximum displacement of 1671.4 long 
tons, the Littoral Combat Ship is unable to use the maximum fuel carrying capacity (both 
Day and Long-Range Tanks).  The third profile includes a Littoral Combat Ship with all 
modular mission packages embarked and fuel weight of 265.8 long tons.  This results in a 
fuel level of 281,730 liters and full displacement of 1671.4 long tons. 
 
Littoral Combat Ship 
Component 
Weight without Modular 
Mission Packages and 
Fuel Capacity of 174,880 
liters 
 (long tons) 
Weight with all Modular 
Mission Packages and 
Fuel Capacity of 174,880 
liters                
  (long tons) 
Weight with all modular 
Mission Packages 
Embarked and Fuel 
Capacity of 281,730 liters  
(long tons)  
Sea frame 922.3 922.3 922.3 
Onboard Systems 34.2 34.2 34.2 
Light Displacement 956.5 956.5 956.5 
Number of Crew 4.7 4.7 4.7 
Number of 
Embarked Personnel 
2.4 2.4 2.4 
Crew effects, Fresh 
Water, Stores and 
Provisions 
142.0 142.0 142.0 
Fuel 165.0 165.0 265.8 
Lube Oil 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Ship's Gear 42.2 42.2 42.2 
Ordnance 39.2 39.2 39.2 
Modular Mission 
Packages 
0.0 217.8 217.8 
Total Deadweight 396.3 614.1 714.9 
Full Displacement 1352.8 1570.6 1671.4 





Table 25 demonstrates the impact of fuel weight on the Littoral Combat Ship full 
displacement both with and without all modular mission systems installed.  It shows that 
when all onboard fuel tanks are filled to maximum capacity, the full displacement of the 
Littoral Combat Ship exceeds the maximum displacement even when no modular mission 
packages are embarked.  The implication of this is that while the modular design does 
provide an increase in the amount of fuel that can be carried onboard, the Littoral Combat 
Ship will be unable to use its maximum fuel carrying capacity regardless of the mission 
profile because its maximum displacement is only 1671.4 long tons. 
 
 
Fuel Tanks Fuel 
Storage   
(liters) 
Fuel 
Weight      
(long tons) 
Full Displacement with 
Modular Mission Packages 
(long tons) 
Full Displacement without 
Modular Mission Packages 
(long tons) 




567580 535.5 1962.5 1723.3 
Table 25.   Impact of Fuel Weight on Full Displacement 
 
 
B. FUEL CONSUMPTION AND ENDURANCE ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the impact of speed, displacement and significant wave 
height on fuel consumption and endurance.  Since the model uses a fixed displacement 
and significant wave height for fuel consumption calculations, the displacement and 
significant wave height parameters are changed individually in order to determine the 





1. Mission Profiles 
In the NWDC Littoral Combat Ship Concept of Operations draft, two potential 
Littoral Combat Ship mission profiles were originally provided: a 5-day Focused Mission 
profile and a 21-day Continuous Mission profile.  These mission profiles are provided in 
Table 26 and Table 27 respectively.  However, the sprint speed of 55 knots as contained 
in the Concept of Operations draft was replaced in the model with the JOINT VENTURE 
maximum speed of 48 knots.  Of interesting note is the column containing the percent of 
time at speed.  In the Focused Mission profile, sprint speed is only used 4.17% of the 
time while in the Continuous Mission profile, sprint speed is used only 0.40% of the time.  
Since the original Concept of Operations draft, these profiles have been eliminated, 
although the percent of time when the ships high-speed capability is used argues against 
the many compromises necessary to achieve this capability.   
 
Table 26.   5-Day Littoral Combat Ship Focused Mission Profile 
 
 





Focused Mision Profile 5 Days
Speed Op-Time Range Percent of Time
(knots) (hours) (nm) at Speed
10 115 1150 95.83%
48 5 240 4.17%
Totals: 120 1390
Continuous Mission Profile 21 Days
Speed Op-Time Range Percent of Time
(knots) (hours) (nm) at Speed
8 502 4016 99.60%
48 2 96 0.40%
Totals: 504 4112
48 
Table 28 lists an alternate 14-day Littoral Combat Ship mission profile that is 
created for model analysis. 
 
Table 28.   14-Day Littoral Combat Ship Analysis Mission Profile 
 
Since the fuel consumption data obtained from the Navy’s JOINT VENTURE 
lessons learned only included a range of speeds from 15 to 40 knots, the selected mission 
profile speeds are restricted to this range.  In addition, the lessons learned stated that 
speeds between fifteen and seventeen knots obtain the best fuel consumption rates.  This 
information is consistent with the findings of this thesis as Figure 4 demonstrates the 
impact of speed on range. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Impact of Speed on Range at 1671.4 long tons Full Displacement, 6-Foot 
Significant Wave Height and 281,730 liters Fuel Carrying Capacity 
Analysis Mission Profile 14 Days
Speed Op-Time Range Fuel Consumed Percent of Time Percent of
(knots) (hours) (nm) (liters) at Speed Total Fuel Consumed
15 268 4020 483507.24 79.76% 51.29%
27 34 918 132677.75 10.12% 14.07%
40 34 1360 326536.83 10.12% 34.64%
Totals: 336 6298 942,721.82


















As a result, fifteen knots was chosen as the base operating speed as it was estimated the 
Littoral Combat Ship would operate at these speeds approximately 80% of the time.  A 
moderate speed of twenty-seven knots and a sprint speed of forty knots were estimated 
operating speeds for approximately 10% of the time each.  By comparing the percent of 
time at and the percent of total fuel consumed for a given speed, one can see the large 
impact ship speed has on fuel consumption.  Even though the Littoral Combat Ship 
operates at fifteen knots for almost 80% of the time, these operations only account for 
51.29% of the fuel consumed while only 10.12% of operating time at forty knots results 
in 34.64% of total fuel consumed.  This is an important finding that is further analyzed 
later in this chapter. 
 
2. Impact of Significant Wave Height 
 Significant wave height is a limiting environmental condition that was identified 
by the Navy during JOINT VENTURE operations as having a considerable impact on 
ship operations with regard to ship speed, fuel consumption and crew.  Table 29 contains 
the Littoral Combat Ship sea state operating requirements as listed in the Littoral Combat 
Ship Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document. (Surface Warfare Directorate, 
2003) 
 
Condition Significant Wave Height 
(feet) 
Requirement 
Sea State 5 12.1 Full capability for all systems 
Sea State 6 18.0 Continuous efficient 
operations 
Sea State 8 and above 58.1 Best heading survival without 
serious damage to mission 
essential subsystems 
Table 29.   Littoral Combat Ship Sea State Operating Requirements 
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Beyond sea state 5, the Littoral Combat Ship can expect to encounter considerable 
restrictions to ship operations as significant wave heights exceed twelve feet.  Even 
though probability distributions have been generated to estimate significant wave heights 
in various regions of the world, actual significant wave heights can vary greatly.  Figures 
5, 6 and 7 contain global significant wave heights for September 2, 2002, February 24, 
2003 and March 1, 2003 respectively. (Colorado Center for Astrodynamics Research, 
2003)  Looking at Figures 5 and 7, it can be seen that significant wave heights in various 
regions of the world differ depending on the season (summer versus winter in these 
figures).  However, comparing Figure 6 and Figure 7 demonstrates that significant wave 
height can also vary considerably from week to week.  It is for this reason that significant 
waves heights can be a severe limiting factor when it comes to Littoral Combat Ship 
operations.  If a Littoral Combat Ship had been assigned to conduct an independent 2-
week mission off the east coast of Japan beginning February 24, 2002, it would have 
been able to conduct operations as wave heights were only approaching sea state 5.  
However, by March 1, significant wave heights increased to more than 20 feet.  As a 
result, the assigned mission would have been interrupted and the Littoral Combat Ship 
would likely have been required to find calmer waters in order to protect mission 
essential systems and reduce the consequences of the increased sea state on crew 
effectiveness.  Even if probability distributions can be used to predict regional significant 
wave heights with a fair amount of accuracy, military missions cannot always wait for 
calm waters.  The anticipated inability of the Littoral Combat Ship to effectively operate 
in water conditions beyond sea state 6 demonstrates it may find itself having difficulties 




Figure 5.   Global Significant Wave Heights for September 2, 2002 
 
 










In addition to the considerable impact significant wave height has on Littoral 
Combat Ship operations, it also demonstrates devastating impact on crew effectiveness.  
Of the twenty-two personnel that were given a questionnaire regarding seasickness 
during joint Navy and Marine Corps testing of the JOINT VENTURE, 70% of those 
surveyed experienced dizziness, 65% experienced nausea and 30% actually became 
seasick.  Of those experiencing dizziness, nausea and/or seasickness, 100% of them 
desired outside visibility and 80% desired weather-deck access in order to ease their 
symptoms.  (Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2002)  While the study did not 
specify the significant wave height at the time of the survey, it is fair to assume 
conditions were below sea state 5 since the data range of significant wave height 
generated during this time for fuel consumption was between 3.5 and 7 feet.  Considering 
the Littoral Combat Ship is expected to operate in wave heights beyond eighteen feet, this 




3. Fuel Consumption Analysis 
In order to study the impact of speed on fuel consumption, the model is set with a 
fixed displacement and significant wave height, and fuel consumption rates are calculated 
for speeds between one and forty-eight knots.  A Littoral Combat Ship with a 
displacement of 1570.6 long tons (includes all modular mission packages and the use of 
Day tanks only) is used along with a significant wave height of six feet (the average of 
the significant wave height data used during regression analysis).  Figure 8 demonstrates 
the relationship between speed and fuel consumption in the Littoral Combat Ship: fuel 
consumption increases with the cube of speed.  The relationship produces a fuel 
consumption curve typical of diesel engines, which is appropriate considering the JOINT 
VENTURE is equipped with four Caterpillar Marine Propulsion Diesel engines. 
 
Figure 8.   Impact of Speed on Fuel Consumption at 1570.6 long tons Full Displacement and 




































To determine the impact of displacement on fuel consumption, a fixed speed of 
fifteen knots, fixed significant wave height of six feet and varying full displacements are 
used.  Displacements between 1352.8 and 1671.4 long tons are used since the previous 
full displacement analysis indicated this was the feasible full displacement range for the 
Littoral Combat Ship.  Figure 9 demonstrates the impact of displacement on fuel 
consumption for the Littoral Combat Ship at an operating speed of fifteen knots (the 
analysis mission profile base operating speed).  Since displacement is a linear term in the 
fuel consumption equation, increases in displacement result in the same increase in fuel 
consumption for any given speed.  Figure 9 shows that as the displacement of the Littoral 
Combat Ship is increased from the minimum feasible displacement (1352.8 long tons) to 
the maximum displacement (1671.4 long tons), fuel consumption increases by 137.73% 
(from 758.9 to 1804.1 liters per hour). 
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Considering the previous discussion to permanently install one MH-60R/S, one 
Fire Scout VT-UAV and one SPARTAN USV (which combined has a weight of 118.35 
long tons), the minimum feasible displacement of the ship increases by 8.77% (1352.8 to 
1471.15 long tons) and fuel consumption increases by 51.16% (758.9 to 1147.2 liters per 
hour).  As a result, at fifteen knots and a significant wave height of six feet, a 1% increase 
in displacement increases fuel consumption by 5.83%.  This finding demonstrates the 
importance of the modular concept with respect to the Littoral Combat Ship.   
Since the significant wave height data utilized in the regression only provides a 
range between 3.5 and 7 feet, the model could not be used to study the impact of sea 
states 5 and beyond on Littoral Combat Ship operations.  However, the analysis is able to 
conclude that even when operating in wave heights below sea state 5, significant wave 
height has a substantial impact on fuel consumption.  This is determined using the most 
economical speed of fifteen knots, fixed displacement of 1671.4 long tons (includes all 
modular mission packages and the maximum fuel carrying capacity) and varying 
significant wave heights between 3.5 and 7 feet.  Figure 10 demonstrates the impact of 
significant wave height on fuel consumption at fifteen knots.   
 
 
Figure 10.   Impact of Significant Wave Height on Fuel Consumption at 15 knots and    
1671.4 long tons Full Displacement 
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As in the previous case with displacement, since significant wave height is a 
linear term in the fuel consumption equation, increases in significant wave height result 
in the same increase in fuel consumption for any given speed.  Figure 10 shows that as 
the significant wave height increases from 3.5 to 7 feet (a 100% increase in significant 
wave height), fuel consumption increases by 1220.69% (from 185.6 to 2451.53 liters per 
hour).  As a result, at fifteen knots and a full displacement of 1671.4 long tons, a 1% 
increase in significant wave height increases fuel consumption by 12.2%.  This finding 
demonstrates that even though the Littoral Combat Ship will be able to operate in 
conditions up to sea state 7, the amount of fuel required during these operations increases 
quickly as significant wave height increases. 
 
4. Endurance Analysis 
The impact of speed on endurance is analyzed by first determining the endurance 
for a Littoral Combat Ship with all modular mission packages installed (full displacement 
of 1570.6 long tons) and a minimum fuel storage capacity (use of Day tanks only).  Then, 
the Littoral Combat Ship is modified by increasing the amount of fuel stored until the 
maximum displacement is attained (increase in full displacement from 1570.6 to 1671.4 
long tons).  This results in a maximum fuel carrying capacity of 281,730 liters.  In both 
scenarios, significant wave height is held constant at six feet.  Figure 11 demonstrates the 
impact of speed on Littoral Combat Ship endurance. 
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Currently, Navy ships utilize a 50% fuel reserve, however, the Navy’s JOINT 
VENTURE lessons learned discusses the penalty paid in fuel economy for carrying 
excess fuel (this further validates the previous discussion with regard to the relationship 
between displacement and fuel consumption).  As a result, it is recommended that only 
the fuel required for the mission at hand should be carried unless readiness to meet 
contingencies dictates otherwise. (Beierl, 2002)  Considering this penalty and the use of a 
20 percent fuel reserve during JOINT VENTURE maximum range testing, fuel reserve 
levels of both 20% (top two curves) and 50% (bottom two curves) are used in the 
analysis.  As fuel is consumed, the weight of fuel decreases and as a result, full 
displacement and fuel consumption decrease as well.  By utilizing a 20% vice 50% fuel 
reserve, the Littoral Combat Ship is able to capitalize on this relationship. 
At all speeds, increasing the fuel reserve from 20% to 50% results in a 60% 
decrease in endurance.  However, the same relationship does not hold for increases in 
fuel carrying capacity.   At the base operating speed of fifteen knots, increasing the fuel 
carrying capacity from 174,880 to 281,730 liters results in an increase of endurance by 





















20% Fuel Reserve 
1570.6 long tons
281,730 liters 
20% Fuel Reserve 
1671.4 long tons
174,880 liters 
50% Fuel Reserve 
1570.6 long tons
281,730 liters 
50% Fuel Reserve 
1671.4 long tons
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31.67%.  At a sprint speed of forty knots, the same increase in fuel carrying capacity 
results in an increase of endurance by 55.57%.  This shows that as speed increases, 
increasing the fuel carrying capacity provides a greater impact on endurance.  Figure 11 
reveals the two most important findings.  Regardless of the fuel reserve or fuel carrying 
capacity, the maximum endurance achieved for a Littoral Combat Ship outfitted with all 
modular mission packages is less than seven days.  In addition, when the Littoral Combat 
Ship is outfitted with all modular mission packages and operated continuously at its 
maximum speed of forty-eight knots, the maximum achieved endurance is only 14.4 
hours.  While this endurance is achieved utilizing a 20% fuel reserve and maximum fuel 
carrying capacity, increasing the fuel reserve to 50% and restricting the fuel carrying 
capacity to Day tanks results in a maximum endurance of only 4.8 hours.  These findings 
demonstrate the considerable impact ship speed has on Littoral Combat Ship endurance. 
Figure 12 illustrates the impact of displacement on endurance.  It is based on the 
speeds and operating times included in the 14-day mission profile (Table 28) and uses a 
fixed significant wave height of 6 feet and a maximum fuel carrying capacity.  As 
displacement increases, endurance decreases.  However, once again the critical finding is 
that the maximum obtainable time on-station is only a little more than 5 days (less than 
40% of the desired 14-day mission requirement) using a 20% fuel reserve.  The 
implication of this is that the Littoral Combat Ship would require at least two fuel 
replenishments if it was going to complete the assigned 14-day mission.  If the Littoral 
Combat Ship was required to maintain a 50% fuel reserve, the maximum obtainable 
endurance would be just over 3 days (less than 25% of the desired 14-day mission 
requirement), and the Littoral Combat Ship would require at least four fuel 
replenishments in order to complete its assigned mission.  
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Figure 12.   Impact of Displacement on Endurance at a 6-foot Significant Wave Height and 
Maximum Fuel Carrying Capacity of 281,730-liters 
 
Figure 13 illustrates the impact of significant wave height on endurance.  It is 
based on the speeds and operating times included in the 14-day mission profile (Table 28) 
and utilizes a fixed displacement of 1671.4 long tons and a maximum fuel carrying 
capacity.  As with displacement, when significant wave height increases, endurance 
decreases.  With a significant wave height of 3.5 feet and a fuel reserve of 20%, the 
Littoral Combat Ship is able to achieve an endurance of only eight days and is required to 
receive one fuel replenishment in order to complete the 14-day mission.  By switching to 
a 50% fuel reserve, the endurance drops to approximately five days, thereby increasing 
the number of required fuel replenishments to two.  As seen earlier with the impact of 
speed on endurance, as significant wave height increases, the 20% and 50% fuel reserve 
curves begin to converge.  This demonstrates the considerable impact significant wave 
height has on Littoral Combat Ship endurance. 
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Figure 13.   Impact of Significant Wave Height on Endurance at 1671.4 long tons Full 
Displacement and Maximum Fuel Carrying Capacity of 281,730-liters 
 
 
C. IMPLICATION ON LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP LOGISTICS 
In order for the Littoral Combat Ship to be an effective asset, it must not only 
possess the endurance necessary to keep pressure on the enemy without having to 
disengage often for replenishment, but it must also possess adequate sea keeping 
characteristics to permit open-ocean transits and extended operations in the world’s 
littorals.  Throughout the analysis, it is shown that increases in speed, displacement and 
significant wave height all result in a considerable increase to fuel consumption and 
severely limit Littoral Combat Ship endurance.  As seen when using the 14-day mission 
profile, the Littoral Combat Ship requires at least one fuel replenishment in order to 
complete its assigned two-week mission.  In order to receive the required replenishments, 
the Littoral Combat Ship must transit to a Combat Logistics Force ship off-station.  Even 
though the Navy does not officially define the extent of the littorals by an actual distance 
from shore, the littorals can be defined as the waterways within 100 miles of the 
coastline. (Boeing, 2003)  Typically, Combat Logistics Force ships operate outside the 
littorals near high-value, blue water assets.   As a result, the Littoral Combat Ship would 
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be required to leave its assigned operating area and transit at least 100 miles to the 
Combat Logistics Force ship in order to rendezvous for the required refueling at sea.  
Assuming the Littoral Combat Ship utilizes its base operating speed of fifteen knots 
during the transit and the Combat Logistics Force ship operates at a safe distance of 150 
nautical miles from the shore, it would take the Littoral Combat Ship ten hours to transit 
each way.  Including an estimated two hours for the actual replenishment, total off-station 
time for the Littoral Combat ship would be 22 hours (6.5% of the total 14-day assigned 
mission).  Table 30 demonstrates the relationship between Littoral Combat Ship 
replenishment requirements and time off-station. 
 
 
Number of Replenishments 
Required 
Total Time Off-Station 
(days) 
Percent of Time Off-Station 
During 14-Day Mission 
1 0.92 6.5% 
2 1.83 13.1% 
3 2.75 19.6% 
4 3.67 26.2% 
5 4.58 32.7% 
Table 30.   Relationship Between Replenishment Requirements and Time Off-Station 
 
Not only does the requirement for replenishments decrease time on-station and 
availability of the Littoral Combat Ship, it places an increased strain on an already over 
burdened Combat Logistics Support force.  Since the critical design parameters require 
that the Littoral Combat Ship be able to conduct both conventional and vertical 
replenishment, the Littoral Combat Ship will rely on the Combat Logistics Force for the 
necessary logistics support.  The deployment of Naval forces in support of OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM resulted in significant increases in Combat Logistics Force 
requirements.  Increases in Fifth Fleet requirements, which were substantial to begin 
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with, were so dramatic that Seventh Fleet and Third Fleet were both required to provide 
additional Combat Logistics Force ships in order to satisfy the high demand within the 
Fifth Fleet operating area. (Haynes, 2002)  The situation has become so drastic that some 
ships have been denied Combat Logistics Force support.  As a result, the ships have been 
forced into port in order to refuel.  Not only does this increase costs, it also places an 
added security risk considering the in-port attack on the USS COLE.  Additionally, 
Combat Logistics Force ships do not receive maintenance while in Fifth Fleet.  The 
negative impact of this has already been demonstrated as the USNS PECOS post-
deployment maintenance put her out of service for several months. (Haynes, 2002)  The 
addition of a fleet of Littoral Combat Ships that will potentially require frequent 
replenishment is only going to make the Combat Logistics Force problem worse. 
 
D. ADDITIONAL LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS 
 Even though reconfiguration is not studied in this thesis, modular mission 
capability, which is the cornerstone of the Littoral Combat Ship design (Katz and Mustin, 
2003), has already been identified as the biggest challenge.  The critical design parameter 
for reconfiguration requires that the Littoral Combat Ship must be able to complete 
reconfiguration within four days and establishes a reconfiguration goal of only one day.  
This is ambitious considering the capability currently does not exist at sea.  While the 
handling and stowage of modular mission packages in port would not be a problem, 
completing reconfiguration at sea would be a much greater challenge as it requires good 
sea keeping.  Considering the previous discussion and illustrations regarding the impact 
of significant wave height on Littoral Combat Ship operations, it is clear the Littoral 
Combat Ship will not always have the benefit of calm seas to reconfigure modular 
mission packages when required.  Even if reconfiguration is achievable at sea, the 
logistics required for reconfiguration is complex.  Questions such as where will the 
modular mission packages be stored and how will they be transported and transferred to 
the Littoral Combat Ship remain unanswered.  If for any reason the Littoral Combat Ship 
is unable to reconfigure for a specific mission while at sea, it would be required to leave 
its assigned operating area and find a port or shipyard-like environment in which it can be 
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reconfigured.  This not only places an additional strain on Littoral Combat Ship logistics 
but also increases time off-station. 
In Chapter I, endurance was defined as the ability to sustain a ship’s mission.  
While for analysis purposes this thesis calculates endurance only using speed and fuel 
consumption rates, in reality it is also measured by ordnance delivery rates and crew 
effectiveness.  The amount of ordnance consumed depends upon the assigned Littoral 
Combat Ship mission, the frequency in which ordnance is required to support the 
mission, and the rate at which it is delivered.  While a Littoral Combat Ship conducting a 
Continuous Mission would most likely have little need for ordnance, one conducting 
littoral Mine Warfare or Anti-Surface Warfare would, of course, have an ordnance 
requirement.  Just as ship speed, displacement, and significant wave height impacts 
endurance, the same holds true for ordnance.  As the delivery rate of ordnance increases, 
the need for replenishment increases as well, thereby potentially further reducing Littoral 
Combat Ship time on-station. 
Crew effectiveness has just as much, if not more, impact on endurance as fuel and 
ordnance.  While earlier discussion of dizziness, nausea and seasickness aboard JOINT 
VENTURE demonstrates the severe negative impact crew effectiveness has on 
endurance, logistics factors such as fresh water, provisions, stores and laundry also have a 
major impact on crew effectiveness.  While current advances in technology have helped 
ease the potential negative impact these logistics factors have on crew effectiveness, they 
cannot be forgotten as they play an important part in crew morale. 
The final, and perhaps most important, questions that need to be addressed are 
where does the Littoral Combat Ship originate from and where does it go back to at the 
conclusion of its mission.  While the Littoral Combat Ship will be required to possess a 
blue-water transit capability, operations are designed for missions of fixed duration inside 
the littorals.  Discussions of 5-day, 14-day and 21-day mission profiles are provided, 
however, there has been no indication as to where the Littoral Combat Ship will transit to 
between missions.  While the shallow draft increases the number of ports available for 
the Littoral Combat Ship to operate out of, they may or may not be friendly.  Not only is 
this an important issue with regard to reconfigurability, it also plays an important role 
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with regard to logistics support and crew effectiveness.  While it should be noted that one 
of the proposed missions of the Littoral Combat Ship is Logistics Support, a Littoral 
Combat Ship configured for a logistics mission still has the same operating constraints 
with respect to fuel consumption and endurance as one those studied in this thesis.  
Without a designated port to base out of, the Littoral Combat Ship endurance problem 
can only get worse. 
 
65 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
“For the 29-year period ending 1999, almost 60 percent of the missions conducted 
by ships were mobility related missions.” (Navy Warfare Development Command, 2003)  
These continuous missions, all of which are listed as potential future Littoral Combat 
Ship requirements, typically require a platform with long endurance, high speed, 
considerable payload capacity, and excellent sea keeping.  Just as the ASHEVILLE, 
PEGASUS and CYCLONE class ships were constrained in their operations due to low 
endurance and limited capability, the output from the Littoral Combat Ship model yields 
similar problems. 
The thesis demonstrates that speed, displacement, and significant wave height all 
result in considerable increases in fuel consumption, and as a result, severely limit 
Littoral Combat Ship endurance.  When operating in a significant wave height of six feet, 
regardless of the amount of fuel carried, the maximum endurance achieved for a Littoral 
Combat Ship outfitted with all modular mission packages is less than seven days.  
Especially noteworthy is that when restricted to a fuel reserve of 50% and a fuel carrying 
capacity of Day tanks, the maximum achieved endurance is only 4.8 hours when 
operating at a maximum speed of 48 knots.  Refueling, and potentially rearming, will 
require the Littoral Combat Ship to leave littoral waters and transit to Combat Logistics 
Force ships operating outside the littorals for replenishment.  Given the low endurance of 
the Littoral Combat Ship, its time on station is seriously compromised.  This not only 
limits the Littoral Combat Ship’s ability to conduct independent operations, but restricts 
interdependent operations as part of a littoral operations force and integrated operations 
with Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups as well. 
Significant wave height not only has a considerable negative impact on fuel 
consumption and endurance, but also has the potential for devastating impact on Littoral 
Combat Ship operations and crew effectiveness.  The anticipated inability of the Littoral 
Combat Ship to effectively operate in ocean conditions beyond sea state 6 coupled with 
the real possibility of experiencing sea states 7 and beyond demonstrates the potential for 
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the Littoral Combat Ship to be forced to either delay or abandon assigned missions.  With 
regard to crew effectiveness, of the twenty-two personnel that were given a questionnaire 
regarding seasickness during joint Navy and Marine Corps testing of the JOINT 
VENTURE, 70% of those surveyed experienced dizziness, 65% experienced nausea and 
30% actually became seasick when operating in sea state 4 and below. 
The Littoral Combat Ship can achieve high speeds; however, this can only be 
accomplished at the expense of range and payload capacity.  The requirement for the 
Littoral Combat Ship to go fast (forty-eight knots) requires a seaframe with heavy 
propulsion systems.  The weight of the seaframe, required shipboard systems (weapons, 
sensors, command and control, and self-defense) and modular mission packages accounts 
for 84% of the full displacement, and as a result, substantially limits total fuel carrying 
capacity.  Since initial mission profiles required the high-speed capability at most five 
percent of the time, the end result is a Littoral Combat Ship that has very little endurance 
and a high-speed capability it will rarely use.  The pursuit for high speed itself 
demonstrates an inherent bias toward the attribute of speed and the neglect of range and 
payload requirements.  Regardless of which hull form is selected for the Littoral Combat 
Ship, this thesis demonstrates the price that must be paid for speed as the tradeoffs 
between speed, endurance, and payload, in general, apply to any ship design. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As this thesis concludes a Littoral Combat Ship similar in size to the JOINT 
VENTURE would not have the endurance necessary to effectively operate in the littorals, 
it would appear the only plausible recommendations would be to either relax the high-
speed requirement or increase the size of the Littoral Combat Ship.  Recently, Norman 
Polmar, author of Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, wrote about the Navy’s current 
Littoral Combat Ship program.  Comparing the efforts to the Israeli 1,275-ton Sa’ar V-
class corvette and the German 1,690-ton Type 130 corvette (which is currently under 
construction), he states the Navy will likely opt for a larger and more expensive Littoral 
Combat Ship.  Despite the plans to utilize a modular design, he believes the Navy’s 
desire for larger, multipurpose ships will result in the proposal of a large (frigate size) 
Littoral Combat Ship. (Polmar, 2002)  According to the Navy’s latest documentation, he 
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appears to be correct, as the Littoral Combat Ship is no longer being pursued as a small 
ship, rather one that weighs approximately 3,000 tons. (Stewart, 2003)  Whereas the 
proposed increase in size of the Littoral Combat Ship indicates the Navy has learned 
something from the previous small, high-speed ship programs, it does not absolve the 
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APPENDIX A:  SEA STATE MATRIX 
 
Sea State Significant Wave Height 
(meters) 
Significant Wave Height 
(feet) 
0 0.0 0.0 
1 0.3 1.0 
2 0.9 3.0 
3 1.4 4.6 
4 2.1 6.9 
5 3.7 12.1 
6 5.5 18.0 
7 12.2 40.0 
8 17.7 58.1 
9 > 39.0 > 128.0 
 
 
Note: Data obtained from the Preliminary Design Interim Requirements Document  
 N763F-S03-026, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Flight 0 Pre ACAT  
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